@article{96246,
  author = {Victoria McGeer},
  title = {Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility},
  abstract = { This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a {\textquotedblleft}regulative"<br>"view{\textquotedblright} of folk-psychology as against the {\textquotedblleft}standard view{\textquotedblright} (encompassing both theory- theory~ and~ simulation~ theory,~ as~ well~ as~ hybrid~ variations).~ On~ the~ regulative~ view, folk-psychology~ is~ conceptualized~ in~ fundamentally~ interpersonal~ terms~ as~ a~ {\textquotedblleft}mind- making{\textquotedblright}~~ practice~~ through~ which~~ we~ come~~ to~~ form~ and~~ regulate~~ our~ minds~ in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms.~ It~ is~ not,~ as~ the~ standard~ view~ maintains,~ simply~ an~ epistemic~ capacity~ for coming~ to~ know~ about~ the~ mental~ states~ and~ dispositions~ already~ there.~ Importantly, the regulative view can meet and beat the standard at its own epistemic game. But it also does more. In Section 2, I show how the regulative view makes progress on two other problems that remain puzzling on the standard view:~ (1) the problem of {\textquotedblleft}first- person authority{\textquotedblright}~ {\textendash}~ accounting for the special features of self-knowledge; and (2) the problem of {\textquotedblleft}reactive responsiveness{\textquotedblright}~ {\textendash}~ accounting for our deep concern with calling"<br>"one another to account for normatively untoward behaviour, both generally and in the moral domain. },
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
  volume = {18},
  pages = {259-281},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2015.1032331},
  language = {eng},
}