@article{92866,
  author = {Victoria McGeer},
  title = {The moral development of first-person authority},
  abstract = { <span lang="EN-AU"><span style={\textquoteright}NewRoman"{\textquoteright}>A fully satisfying account of 1<sup>st</sup> person authority should satisfy two desiderata: (1) explain the privileged relation we bear to our own intentional states sufficient to justify a default presumption of authority; (2) explain why such authority matters for our ability to function well as rational agents.~ The traditional epistemological approach fails on the second desideratum, suggesting the more radical alternative of analyzing first-person authority in terms of a rational and self-regulative capacity we have to author our own intentional states.~~ In comparing different versions of this {\textquotedblleft}agency{\textquotedblright} model of authoritative self-knowledge, I argue that Richard Moran{\textquoteright}s Kantian ideal of rational autonomy is neither necessary nor sufficient for well-functioning agency; worse, the ideal is unsuitable for human beings given our moral developmental liabilities. Using examples drawn from George Eliot{\textquoteright}s <i>Middlemarch</i>, I argue we become better authoritative agents through embracing a less ambitious rational ideal.</span></span> },
  year = {2007},
  journal = {European Journal of Philosophy },
  volume = {16},
  pages = {81-108},
  language = {eng},
}