@article{130146,
  author = {V. McGeer},
  title = {Intelligent Capacities},
  abstract = {<p>In <em>The Concept of Mind</em>, Gilbert Ryle argued that a more sophisticated understanding of the dispositional nature of {\textquoteleft}intelligent capacities{\textquoteright} could bolster philosophical resistance to the tempting view that the human mind is possessed of metaphysically {\textquoteleft}occult{\textquoteright} powers and properties. This temptation is powerful in the context of accounting for the special qualities of responsible agency. Incompatibilists indulge the temptation; compatibilists resist it, using a variety of strategies. One recent strategy, reminiscent of Ryle{\textquoteright}s, is to exploit a more sophisticated understanding of dispositional properties to account for these qualities. But {\textquoteleft}new dispositionalists{\textquoteright} run up against a {\textquoteleft}hard problem{\textquoteright} that threatens the approach. This paper argues that the threat may be averted by embracing a yet more radical {\textquoteleft}Rylean{\textquoteright} view of the distinctive dispositional nature of intelligent capacities.</p>
},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Proceedings and Addresses of the Aristotelian Society},
  volume = {118},
  chapter = {1},
  pages = {1-30},
  url = {https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/advance-article/doi/10.1093/arisoc/aoy017/5116368?guestAccessKey=5a5fdc6f-174f-4c8f-a165-ae8c8ef34670},
  doi = {10.1093/arisoc/aoy017},
  language = {eng},
}